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About the Project 
D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. 
It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, 
particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises 
this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the 
goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our 
intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of 
being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and 
political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity 
formulations.  
D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans 
national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, 
Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and 
several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political 
science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. 
Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic 
workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous 
foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-
radicalisation. 
With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several 
minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative 
analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The 
process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in 
uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad 
accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances 
that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The 
participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to 




This report provides a brief presentation of the context, structures and stakeholders of 
(de-)radicalisation in contemporary Hungary. The prevalent form of radicalisation in 
present-day Hungary is right-wing extremism mixed with ethno-nationalist, anti-
establishment and religious elements, shaped by the legacy of Trianon, the Horthy-
era1 and the fascist Arrow Cross Party (Nyilaskeresztes Párt).2 The most significant 
events that prompted radicalisation were party politics right after the collapse of the 
one-party system in 1989; the socio-economic situation and subsequent crisis of the 
socialist-liberal government in 2006; and the so-called “refugee crisis” in 2015. Right-
wing polarisation led to the most shocking events in contemporary Hungary, the Roma 
murders in 2008-2009. Besides Roma, the usual targets of violence are Jews, 
migrants and the LGBTQI community. There have been several far-right group 
formations since the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. However, the Fidesz-
KDNP3 party alliance currently in power has systematically taken over the platform 
and narratives of Jobbik.4 While the latter has been moving to the centre, the former 
has become gradually more radical both in terms of political discourse and social 
policy. Fidesz has essentially closed the political space and monopolised right-wing 
radicalisation in Hungary; social-liberal values, the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI 
communities have been under constant attack by the government. As a consequence, 
efforts of de-radicalisation and reducing hate crime remain with stakeholders, such as 




1  Miklós Horthy was the regent of Hungary between 1920-1944. 
2  The Arrow Cross Party was the Hungarian Nazi Party founded in 1935 and in power between 
October 1944 and March 1945. 
3  ‘Fidesz’ is the abbreviation for ‘Fiatal Demokraták Szövetség’ (Alliance of Young Democrats); 
KDNP is the abbreviation for ‘Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt’ (Christian Democratic People’s 
Party). 
4  The name ‘Jobbik’ is an untranslatable play on words. ‘Jobb’ means both ‘right’ and ‘better’; ‘jobbik’ 




This report is part of the Work Package “Mapping Stakeholders and Situations of 
Radicalisation” of the D-Rad project. Its objective is to introduce the context, the patterns, and 
the most prominent agents and stakeholders of (de-)radicalisation in Hungary. By 
radicalisation we mean a process involving the increasing rejection of established law, order, 
and politics and the active pursuit of alternatives, in the form of politically-driven violence or 
justification of violence. Conversely, by de-radicalisation we mean processes countering such 
rejection at individual (micro), organisational (meso), or societal (macro) levels resulting in a 
shift from violent to nonviolent strategies and tactics. The cases of radicalisation the project 
focuses on are ethnonationalist, separatist, jihadist, right-wing, and left-wing radicalism. 
Concerning Hungary, however, the only relevant form of radicalisation is right-wing extremism; 
jihadist, separatist or left-wing radicalism are not applicable, at least not in the period in 
question. 
The report is based on secondary sources. In setting the scene, section 2 describes the overall 
historical and macro-political context in which radicalisation enfolds and the most important 
events that prompted radicalisation in the past 20 years. Section 3 outlines the most violent 
acts attributable to extremism; how that is perceived and amplified by the political elite; and 
the perception of threat by the general public. Section 4 introduces the most important agents 
of radicalisation, and their links to political parties and state agents. The section also explains 
how these agents communicate with their supporters and mainstream their agenda in public. 
Finally, section 5 introduces the most important of the very few stakeholders, all of which are 
dedicated to fighting and preventing radicalisation, their objectives and activities, and the 
programmes they have been involved where applicable. The report is short, especially 
compared to how extensive it could be given the plethora of issues at stake and the sources 
available. However, its aim is only to provide a snapshot of radicalisation in Hungary as an 
introduction to future work package reports that will look into and analyse the issues outlined 
below separately and at length.    
 
2. Contextual background  
The first radical right party that falls within the scope of this report was MIÉP. Although no 
longer in parliament, the circumstances of MIÉP’s establishment highlights the significance of 
the irredentist and revisionist Horthy-regime of the interwar period to understand the manifesto 
of present-day far-right movements in Hungary. MIÉP was established by István Csurka in 
1993, who was also founding member of MDF.5 Csurka was expelled from MDF because of 
his critical stance towards its politics (cf. Fabry 2015). Among other issues, he problematised 
the failure of the Antall-government to initiate the revision of the Treaty of Trianon.6 As we 
 
5  Following the collapse of the one-party rule, the centre-right Magyar Demokrata Fórum (Hungarian 
Democratic Forum) formed Hungary’s first democratically elected government in 1990, led by 
József Antall.  
6  ‘The Small Catechism of MIEP’, Online: 
http://www.eredetimiep.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=56. 
[Accessed 01 February 2021]; The text of the Catechism refers to the treaty on “good 
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shall see later, the grievance caused by Hungary losing 2/3rd of its territory, the “Trianon 
trauma”, is one of the root causes behind the popularity of right-wing parties and groups to 
date (cf. Kondor and Littler 2020; Molnár 2016).  
However, not only was the Horthy-regime irredentist, but also anti-Communist and anti-
Semitic. It is the incitement against leftist sympathizers and the Jews as enemies of the 
Hungarians that led to the rapes, tortures and mass executions of the “White Terror” between 
1919-1920.7 In Jobbik’s interpretation, the violence and killings under Horthy only served the 
restoration of order in the country, following the bloodshed of the 1919 Hungarian Soviet 
Republic (“Red Terror”). Thus, to Jobbik, Horthy represents a strong, “law and order” leader, 
which is why Horthy’s figure has played a central role in legitimising Jobbik's identity politics 
and platform (Turbucz 2014). Jobbik has drawn a parallel between the atmosphere in the 
country right after WWI and contemporary issues of public order, for which the party 
predominantly blamed the Roma, the largest ethnic minority group in Hungary. Roma 
communities form the largest ethnic minority group in Hungary making up the 8 % of the 
population (Hera 2017). Public attitude towards Roma is notoriously aversive and hostile in 
Hungary; the vast majority of the non-Roma population would avoid social interaction with the 
Roma (Váradi 2014, ch. 3; Hera 2017). The Roma are stigmatised, discriminated against and 
are often highly segregated, and live with all the disadvantages this entails (Kállai, Papp and 
Vízi 2017; Gimes, Juhász, Kiss, Krekó and Somogyi 2008). The term “cigánybűnöző”, i.e. 
Gypsy-criminal has been openly and frequently used by far-right groups, such as Jobbik, 
blaming Roma for crime rates. Jobbik mainstreamed anti-Roma sentiments in Hungarian 
public discourse and claimed that the only solution to the “Gypsy-question” (Cigánykérdés) 
and “Gypsy-crime” (Cigánybűnözés) would be the restoration of the interwar leadership model 
(Turbucz 2014). Karácsony and Róna argue, it was not some kind of grievance or frustration 
per se, but the increasing anti-Roma sentiments among the Hungarian public that lied behind 
the success of Jobbik (Karácsony and Róna 2010). The Jobbik only amplified these attitudes 
by further polarising its audience and picking on some especially serious crimes at that time 
committed by people with Roma background; such was the murder of Marian Cozma, a 
handball player in Veszprém and the lynching and murder of a teacher in Olaszliszka in 2009. 
As a result, the majority of Hungarians found these murders a more important issue at that 
time than the 2009 EP election (Karácsony and Róna 2010; Vidra and Fox 2014).  
Following the 2006 crisis of the Gyurcsány-led socialist-liberal government, left-liberal values 
and opposition parties have been disenfranchised, leaving no real alternatives for voters. As 
opposed to Karácsony and Róna (2010), both Fabry (2015) and Varga (2014) underline that 
Jobbik’s success is not attributable simply to the high level of anti-Roma, but predominantly to 
anti-establishment sentiments and the overall decline of liberal values. Between 2002 and 
2009, anti-establishment sentiments among voters changed from 12% to 46% (Juhász, Krekó 
and Molnár 2014). Jobbik (and Fidesz for that matter) had blamed the socialist-liberal 
government (and neoliberalism, globalisation, multinational companies, and, of course, the 
Jews, in general) for poverty, unemployment and the intensification of social and economic 
 
neighbourhood and cooperation” with Ukraine: See Act XLV of 1995 on the announcement of the 
treaty: https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=99500045.tv.  
7  Horthy’s personal responsibility in all this and in the subsequent rehabilitation of militia members 
as “patriots” is well-documented (Bodo 2011, 2019), as well as his consent to the discrimination 
and “assimilation” of Jews during the interwar period, and eventually their deportation to Nazi 
concentration camps (Romsics 2016; Kerekes 2018, pp. 211-229; Ungváry 2016).  
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inequalities in the country. This highly charged atmosphere of dissatisfaction reached its 
climax with Ferenc Gyurcsány’s infamous Őszöd speech8 which instantly ignited massive-
scale demonstrations. As Varga notes, Jobbik only linked these anti-establishment sentiments 
with the Roma by problematising the economic situation in the country from an 
ethnonationalist perspective. Jobbik argued that the root causes of “Gypsy crime” is the 
economic deprivation in the society which triggers ethnic tension between the Roma and 
Hungarians (Varga 2014; cf. Molnár 2016).  
Besides the Roma, the most targeted ethnic minority group in Hungary that has been affected 
by racial hatred are the Jews (Kovács 2010; Gimes et al. 2008). According to a CNN poll on 
anti-Semitism in Europe, about one in five people in Hungary has “unfavourable attitude” 
toward Jews.9 A 2019 global survey shows that Hungary is among the most anti-Semitic 
countries.10 While anti-Semitism is predominantly right-wing ideology, aversion towards the 
Roma is not party-specific (Gimes et al. 2008). It has been argued that xenophobia, in general, 
does not necessarily presuppose right-wing political inclination in Hungary for that matter 
(Enyedi, Erős and Fábián 2001). Stereotypes of the Roma and the Jews are, however, 
interrelated. According to Jobbik, the Jews control world politics and economy, and Roma are 
only a tool or “biological weapon” of the Jews to undermine and overtake state control (Krekó 
2018, pp. 175-178; Thorleifsson 2017). The anti-Semitism of the Horthy-era, blaming the Jews 
for the misery of Hungarians, has still been present in contemporary political discourse. In 
2008, Krisztina Morvai, later MEP for Jobbik, warned the "liberal-Bolshevik Zionists" to start 
thinking about "where to flee and where to hide".11 In 2012, MP Márton Gyöngyösi, then deputy 
of Jobbik urged the registration of Jewish members of the parliament, who, according to 
Gyöngyösi, “pose a risk to national security” (See Appendix 2). The phenomenon of mass 
migration is no exception in this regard. The government’s “Stop Soros'' campaign and its 
impact on public opinions provides a solid proof to this argument. The covert anti-Semitism is 
palpable in narratives scapegoating George Soros for anything of which Orbán disapproves, 
especially irregular migration. Anti-Semitism seemingly serves as a bridge between anti-Roma 
and anti-immigrant sentiments (Thorleifsson 2017). In other words, anti-Semitic conspiracy 
theories relating to the Roma are a catalyst for anti-immigrant sentiments. Analogously to 
conspiracy theories which portray the Roma as the tool of the Jews to overtake Hungary and 
Europe, it is now Soros who is accused of masterminding irregular migration. Accordingly, the 
vocabulary of threat has been transferred from Roma to migrants: the term “Roma-criminal” 
as “genetic-waste” has now been transformed into “migrant-criminal” as “human waste”. 
Instead of the Roma, it is now the migrants who are perceived to be the “biological weapon” 
of the Jews in right-wing circles (Thorleifsson 2017; cf. Vidra and Fox 2014). Jobbik essentially 
used the same recipe and appealed to the legacy of Horthy when inciting their supporters 
against asylum seekers at the outbreak of the so-called “refugee crisis” in 2015 (cf. 
Thorleifsson 2017). 
 
8  At a congress in Balatonözsöd, Gyurcsány criticised his party (MSZP) for lying to the people. The 
speech was leaked and broadcasted in the national radio. 
9  See CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2018/11/europe/antisemitism-poll-2018-intl/.  
10  See ADL: https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-global-survey-of-18-countries-finds-
hardcore-anti-semitic-attitudes-remain.  





The reason why the refugee crisis could be exploited by right-wing groups is also resulted 
from a lack of certain factors. Hungary has been a relatively closed society in the sense that 
immigrants make up only a fragment of the total population as opposed to Western Member 
States (Krekó, Juhász and Molnár 2011). There has been an increasing lack of tolerance 
towards immigrants and ethnic minorities coupled with a growing welfare chauvinism and 
prejudices (Csepeli, Fábián and Sik, 2001; Krekó et al. 2011; Simonovits and Bernát 2016; 
Juhász and Molnár 2016).12 One could argue that the Hungarian society was predisposed to 
buy into the anti-immigrant narratives of Jobbik and Fidesz-KDNP. This is precisely why 
Fidesz campaigned with the promise to preserve the “ethnic homogeneity” of Hungary and 
later successfully dismantled the entire asylum system with the consent of the public (Gyollai 
2018). 
 
3. Structures of radicalisation  
3.1. Political violence in Hungary 
Jihadist, separatist or left-wing terrorism is not applicable in the Hungarian context, at least 
not in the period in question. Again, the only (relevant) form of radicalisation is right-wing 
extremism. By violence we not only mean terrorist attacks, but also e.g. violent attacks against 
members of minority groups, violent extremist demonstrations or desecration of cemeteries of 
minority groups. These events, however, must be linked to, or explicitly influenced by, 
radicalised groups. “Lone wolf” perpetrators without such connections fall outside the scope 
of this report. It has to be noted that the data available in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
is misleading in this regard. The Database lists eight cases from the past 20 years, only two 
of which satisfies the above criteria. Conversely, while the attack in Tatárszentgyörgy (see 
below) is listed, the Database is silent on the other cases of the series. According to its incident 
summary, “it has not been known if the attack was racially motivated”.13 Nor does the list 
include the siege of the Hungarian Television by the right-wing (an event similar to the Capitol 
riot) during the 2006 riots, where over 100 police officer were injured.14 In what follows, I will 
provide a brief summary of the major violent acts against the Roma and Jewish ethnic 
minorities, migrants, and the LGBTQI community. 
The public atmosphere discussed earlier and its amplification by Jobbik set the scene for one 
of the most appalling events in recent Hungarian history: the 2008-2009 Roma Murders. Four 
men killed six people leaving many others seriously injured at nine different scenes: 
Galgagyörk, Piricse, Nyíradony-Tamásipuszta, Tarnabod, Nagycsécs, Alsózsolca, 
Tatárszentgyörgy, Tiszalök and Kisléta. At most of the scenes the killers set the building on 
fire by throwing Molotov cocktails on it, while the victims were sleeping, and opened fire at 
them when escaping. In Tatárszentgyörgy, they shot a father and his five-year-old son dead. 
The five-year-old daughter got shot but managed to run back in the burning house, this is how 
 
12  Also see DEREX (Demand for Right-wing Extremism) Index: 
http://derexindex.eu/countries/Hungary#Hungary. [Accessed 08 February 2021]  
13  Online https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200106180003. 
[Accessed 26 March 2021].  




she survived. The subsequent criminal investigation was biased, prolonged and full of 
procedural misconduct and/or failures. The suspects were initially not charged with hate crime, 
nor did the charges specifically mention the racial motives of the crimes. The killers’ specific 
motivation was, however, to resolve the issue of “Gypsy crime” themselves because they 
found the marches, harassment and intimidation of the Hungarian Guard insufficient; prior to 
the killings, the Guard first marched in Tatárszentgyörgy (Subert 2019; Feischmidt and Hervik 
2015; Vidra and Fox 2014).15 One would assume that such grave consequences of politically 
fuelled racial hatred against an ethnic minority group would result in a drastic change of public 
discourse, at least in a ban on anti-Roma rallies. Jobbik and the Hungarian Guards, however, 
kept organising marches e.g. in Gyöngyöspata in March 2011, where members of the Guard 
patrolled the village harassing and abusing the Roma community for almost a whole month 
without impunity (Amnesty 2012). The 2008-2009 case has recently been reopened by the 
police because one of the perpetrators confessed that they received financial and other 
support from Jobbik circles.16  
According to the reports of the Brussels Institute,17 an anti-Semitic hate crime monitoring 
group, the average annual number of incidents was 39 in the past seven years. Most of the 
incidents were hate speech, but there were also vandalism, threats and assaults among the 
identified cases. The majority of the cases are committed spontaneously.18 The latest 
organised incident attributable to a right-wing group (also listed by GTD) is the raid of a 
community centre in Budapest called Auróra in October 2019. Several dozens of members of 
Légió Hungária (Legion Hungary) raided Auróra, which was closed at the time, and put Neo-
Nazi stickers all over the place. They also removed a rainbow flag from the entrance and set 
it on fire.19  
Concerning violence against migrants by the far-right, one of the major events is attributable 
to László Toroczkai (see below), mayor of Ásotthalom, a village in the Hungarian-Serbian 
border region. The mayor organised a civil militia to capture irregular migrants in the vicinity 
of the village. Migrants were being photographed on their knees or lying on the ground, face 
down, with hands tied behind their back. The mayor later posted the photos on his Facebook 
page and referred to these activities as “migrant-hunting”.20  
Regarding attacks against the LGBTQI community, the far-right frequently and notoriously 
disrupted Budapest Pride and abused (verbally and physically) the participants. In summer 
2008, a gay bar and a gay sauna were hit by a Molotov cocktail. Although no organisation 
claimed the attacks, they were attributed to Hunnia, a far-right movement established by 
György Budaházy and Toroczkai to carry out armed attacks against members of the 
Gyurcsány government.21 In 2019, a group led by Budaházy disrupted an LGBTQI awareness 
 
15  On the case, trial and aftermath in Hungarian see: https://444.hu/tag/romagyilkossagok.  
16  See Pesti Srácok.hu: https://pestisracok.hu/ujra-keresi-a-rendorseg-a-romagyilkossagok-felbujtoit-
a-halalbrigad-vezetoje-allitja-jobbikos-korok-tamogattak-oket/.  
17  Founded by TEV Foundation (Tett és Védelem Alapítvány): https://tev.hu/en/.  
18  See TEV: https://tev.hu/en/annual-report/.  
19  See TEV: https://tev.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/APL_monthly_2019OCT_72dpiKESZ.pdf.  
20  ‘A Hungarian mayor makes a show of “migrant-hunting”’, The Observers, 08 February 2016, 
Online: https://observers.france24.com/en/20160802-hungary-mayor-migrant-hunting-asotthalom. 
[Accessed on 10 February 2021].  




event in Auróra in the presence of the police.22 Very recently, a children’s book has been 
published which retells popular stories but with LGBTQI characters. Dóra Dúró, deputy leader 
of Our Homeland Movement, simply shredded the book in public.23  
3.2. Perception of radicalisation by the political elite 
In Hungary, not only has the government downplayed right-wing radicalism but monopolised 
it. Although initiated by MIÉP and MDF,24 and maintained by Jobbik, the Horthy-cult and the 
nostalgia for the Christian-nationalist sentiments of the Horthy-regime has been continued by 
the Fidesz-KDNP government (Palonen 2018; Miklóssy and Nyyssönen 2018; Turbucz 2013, 
2014). It is precisely the legacy of the interwar period that forms the ideological foundation of 
the political and legal order established by Fidesz. The Christian-nationalist value system of 
the Fundamental Law of Hungary25 represents the manifestation of the Fidesz’ efforts to filter 
history and re-establish collective memory, mainstreaming an idealised and false 
interpretation of the cultural heritage of the Horthy-era (Kis 2012; Fabry 2015; Miklóssy and 
Nyyssönenm 2018; cf. Foley, Gyollai, and Szalanska (Forthcoming).26 In 2019, the Fidesz-
KDNP government symbolically removed the iconic statue of Imre Nagy, leader of the 1956 
Revolution, to replace it by the monument that stood there before WWII, erected by Horthy to 
the victims of the 1919 communist regime.27 Prior to that, in 2014, the government erected a 
monument to the victims of the Nazi occupation. The monument depicts Hungary as Gabriel 
the Archangel attacked by the German imperial eagle, whitewashing the role of the Horthy-
regime in the Holocaust.28 Fidesz remains silent and shows no condemnation when far-right 
groups commemorating the SS breakout attempt during the siege of Budapest in 1945 as “the 
Day of Honour” (Becsület Napja) and when right-wing groups marching in the capital chanting 
“Mocskos zsidók!” (dirty Jews!).29 Zoltán Pokorni, long-standing Fidesz mayor of District XII of 
Budapest has long refused to remove the infamous Turul Monument from the district. The 
monument has already been controversial due to its association with far-right groups. Recent 
research found that Pokorni’s grandfather, whose name is on the list of “heroes” of WWII on 
the monument, had a significant role in the torture and execution of Jews in the district in 1944-
45 as an Arrow Cross member (Rab 2019). Dániel Ács’ groundbreaking documentary A 
Gyilkosok Emlékműve (2021) has revealed that the place where the monument stands was 
 
22  See 444: https://444.hu/2019/09/26/budahazyek-megzavartak-egy-lmtb-tematikaju-rendezvenyt-
az-auroraban.  
23  ‘Another Hungarian book shredded because of “homesexual propaganda”’ Online: 
https://dailynewshungary.com/another-hungarian-book-shredded-because-of-homosexual-
propaganda-which-one-will-be-next/.  
24  Horthy’s ceremonial reburial in 1993 was organised by MDF, and Antall referred to him as a 
“Hungarian patriot” (Fabry 2015). 
25   The new constitution of Hungary passed by the Fidesz-KDNP majority Parliament in 2011. 
26  Though this reinterpretation of collective memory by the Hungarian right-wing to conceptualise 
contemporary issues is not merely restricted to the Horthy-era only (cf. Korkut 2017).   
27  The statue was originally at Martyr’s Square (Vértanúk tere, Budapest) and has been moved to 
Jászai Mari Square. See ‘Hungary removes statue of anti-Soviet hero Imre Nagy’ BBC, 28 
December 2018, Online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-46704111.  
28  ‘Hungarian nationalist rock opera to retell 1920s grievances: Treaty that sliced up territory after first 
world war remains a source of anti-liberal sentiment’ 22 June 2018, The Guardian, Online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/22/hungarian-nationalist-rock-opera-to-retell-1920s-
grievances. [Accessed 04 February 2021] 





the scene of a mass murder in which not only Pokorni’s grandfather, but at least 21 others on 
the list were active participants. Between October 1944 and March 1945, over 1600 Jews 
were raped, tortured and executed in District XII by their own neighbours and fellow-citizens.30 
At the time of writing, the monument still has not been removed and neither the council nor 
the mayor himself, as opposed to his earlier statements, wish to remove, or, at least, rename 
it.31     
Fidesz has taken on a leading role in polarisation and threat construction. In his article in 
Magyar Hírlap, Zsolt Bayer, close friend of Viktor Orbán, argued that the “vast majority of 
Roma” are “animals” and are “incapable of living with human beings” in 2013 (see Appendix 
2). Bayer is a founding member of Fidesz and leading voice of pro-government media. In the 
same year, on the anniversary of the murders in Tatárszentgyörgy, the State Secretariat for 
Social Inclusion of the Orbán Cabinet blurred the events of Olaszliszka and Tatárszentgyörgy 
in its commemorating statement and essentially declared that All Lives Matter because “these 
victims are victims of the same hatred and deserve justice equally”.32 In 2016, remembering 
the murders in Kisléta, Zoltán Balog,33 the Minister himself said: “We here in Europe fight to 
avoid that the external challenges of migration overshadow the issues of the poor and those 
falling behind in Europe” (Balog quoted in Subert 2019). In 2020, the government refused to 
pay financial compensation to Roma children ordered by court, who had been segregated in 
the public school of Gyöngyöspata between 2004 and 2017. According to PM Orbán, such 
compensation would be unacceptable for Hungarians who “slog all day” for their living (See 
Appendix 2). 
Regarding the refuge crisis, the government argued that the migration crisis had been 
unleashed by the Hungarian-American investor and philanthropist George Soros, who is of 
Jewish descent, and whose plan is to “settle one million migrants in Europe''.34 Conversely, 
Orbán portrayed himself as the protector of Hungary and the European Christianity in erecting 
a barbed wire fence at the Southern borders of Hungary in 2015 to keep the mainly Muslim 
migrants out of territory. Fidesz implied that PM Orbán should be compared to none other than 
János Hunyadi himself, commander and hero of the Ottoman wars.35 The government 
envisioned hordes of Muslim “invaders” whose purpose, besides Islamisation and destroying 
Western civilisation, was to abuse Hungarian women (Mendelski 2019; Vidra 2017). The 
campaign has been overwhelming. It has been channelled through public media outlets and 
 
30  A Gyilkosok Emlékműve (Monument to the Murderers) (2021). [Online] Directed by Dániel Ács. 
Budapest: 444. Available with English subtitle from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ygZB1MTRR4&ab_channel=444.hu.   
31  ‘Pokorni Zoltán újabb fordulata: nem lesz I. világháborús emlékmű a turulszobor’ 444.hu, Onlne: 
https://444.hu/2021/02/01/pokorni-zoltan-ujabb-fordulata-maradhat-ii-vilaghaborus-emlekmu-a-
turulszobor.  
32  ‘Rasszista gyilkosságok: Balog Zoltán minisztériuma kiverte a biztosítékot’ nol.hu Online: 
http://nol.hu/belfold/rasszista_gyilkossagok__balog_zoltan_miniszteriuma_kiverte_a_biztositekot-
1369145.  
33  Zoltan Balog is now Bishop of the Reformed Church. 
34  See national consultation on the “Soros Plan”: 
https://theorangefiles.hu/?s=stop+soros&submit=Search.  
35  ‘Hunyadi János = Orbán Viktor: nem csak a rezsit vágja, Német Szilárd otthon van a 
történelemben is’ Magyar Narancs, 22 July 2018, Online: https://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/nemeth-
szilard-minden-alkalmat-megragad-arra-hogy-az-europat-fenyegeto-veszelyrol-beszeljen-112540; 
‘Viktor Orbán’s claims of historical antecedents’, Hungarian Spectrum, 27 September, 2015, 
Online:  http://hungarianspectrum.org/2015/09/27/viktor-orbans-claims-of-historical-antecedents/. 
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other pro-government media, billboards, campaign events held nationwide by members of the 
government and/or government appointed security experts, as well as “national consultations'' 
(propaganda leaflets sent to every household). The billboard campaign displayed messages, 
such as “If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture” or “If you come to Hungary, 
you can’t take the jobs of the Hungarian” (cf. Szalai and Gőbl 2015; Gyollai 2018). The 
government launched an “information campaign” with statements such as “Did you know? 
More than 300 people were killed in terrorist attacks in Europe since the start of the migrant 
crisis” or “Did you know? Since the start of the immigrant crisis, sexual harassment of women 
has increased in Europe” (Sereghy 2017). Orbán declared that Hungarians do not want to be 
a “nation of migrants”; migration brings “terror” and “public insecurities”. He maintained that 
Hungary has the right to preserve its “ethnic homogeneity” and “cultural composition”; mass 
migration represents a threat to the Hungarian “way of life”, culture, customs and traditions 
(Mendelski 2019; cf. Annexes 7.2). The PM has declared that anyone against his efforts is 
against the nation. The government claimed that migration is accelerated by the left-liberal 
lobby and put EU institutions and NGOs that stood up against Orbán’s exclusionary politics 
under attack.  
Threat construction is the driving principle of Orbán's politics (Palonen 2018; Antal 2016). 
Identifying new enemies is a never-ending quest for Fidesz; though LGBTQI communities 
have long been under attack (Gyollai and Korkut 2020). The parliament has recently passed 
the ninth amendment to the constitution to further curtail the rights of LGBTQI people.36 
According to the new amendment, “the mother is a woman, the father is a man” and children 
now have the constitutional right to be raised “in line with Hungary’s constitutional identity and 
Christian culture”. To Orbán, the term “Christian” is a multi-purpose ingroup attribute which 
served as identifier for voters in opposition to Ferenc Gyurcsány’s socialist-liberal government, 
then as the synonym of “Islamophobic”, and has now become a cue for “homophobic”. In his 
weekly radio interview, reflecting on the earlier mentioned children’s book as “provocation”, 
Orbán’s message to LGBTQ communities was: “the Hungarians are patient with the 
phenomenon (homosexuality)...but there is a red line not to cross…leave our children alone!” 
(See Appendix 2). Members of the government simply refer to the struggle of the LGBTQ 
community for rights and recognition as “gay-lobby” (meleglobbi).37  
There is a lack of consistent counter-narratives or disapproval from the left-liberal Opposition 
and any such attempts, mainly by NGOs, are discredited by Fidesz (cf. Sereghy 2017). 
“Liberalism” has essentially become a swear word in political discourse. Opposition parties 
predominantly frame their agenda around the corruption and authoritarianism of the Orbán 
government. Due to the proliferation of right-wing sentiments, concepts such as “diversity”, 
“solidarity” and “human rights” are hardly competitive in contemporary Hungarian politics. 
Thus, the Opposition try to avoid topics of migration or LGBTQI rights rather than embrace 
 
36  Ironically, just a few weeks before the parliament passed the amendment, former MEP József 
Szájer, founding member of Fidesz, made headlines worldwide after his arrest fleeing along a 
gutter to escape Belgian police following a raid on a “gay sex orgy”. Not only was Szájer personally 
responsible for laying down the constitutional basis of LGBTQ discrimination in Hungary as co-
author of the new constitution in 2011, but his sexual orientation has apparently been well-known 
in the Fidesz for 30 years. See 444 “Ennek a kockázatát harminc éve tudja mindenki a Jóskával 
kapcsolatban” Online: https://444.hu/2020/12/04/ennek-a-kockazatat-harminc-eve-tudja-mindenki-
a-joskaval-kapcsolatban.   




them. This tendency is well exemplified by the former PM, current leader of DK (Democratic 
Coalition), Ferenc Gyurcsány’s comment on Orbán’s reaction to the children’s book with 
LGBTQI characters (see Appendix 2).  
3.3. Perception of threat by the general public 
The Fidesz-KDNP coalition won a landslide victory in the 2018 election with no platform other 
than the anti-immigrant hate campaign. The overwhelming majority of the Hungarians 
perceive irregular migrants as a physical and civilisational threat (Simonovits and Szeitl 2019; 
Simonovits 2020). As we elsewhere discussed, people have been abused for supporting 
migrants, and others have been reported to the police because of their skin colour or simply 
because of covering their head with a scarf (Gyollai and Korkut 2019). According to the latest 
poll, 54% of the voters would vote for Fidesz and the second most popular party within the 
Opposition coalition is Jobbik with 14%.38 It is authoritarian right-wing politics that appeal to 
the majority of Hungarian voters. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising why the Opposition have 
failed to vehemently oppose e.g. the Fidesz’ asylum policy. 
 
4. Agents and channels of radicalisation  
4.1. Collective agents accountable for violent incidents  
According to Varga (2014), another reason behind Jobbik’s popularity was a radical and 
immediate answer to the crime rate issues attributed to the Roma by many: the establishment 
of the Hungarian Guard Movement in August 2007. It was established as a response and 
solution to “Gypsy crime” with individuals from the inner circle of Fidesz among its members, 
such as András Bencsik, Fidesz party member and journalist. The movements essentially 
manifested in an openly anti-Roma and anti-Semitic, paramilitaristic group, registered 
personally by Gábor Vona, then leader of Jobbik. Initially 56 people joined the Guard which 
never had more than a few hundred members. Between 2007 and 2009 the Guard held 
several marches in Budapest and in villages, such as Tatárszentgyörgy, Kerepes, Nyírkáta, 
Vásárosnamény, Pátka and Sarkad, harassing and insulting the predominantly Roma 
population (Varga 2014; Fabry 2015). On 16 November 2009, commemorating Horthy’s 1919 
entry to Budapest at the head of the National Army, Jobbik politicians were talking about 
“Gypsy-terror” to their audience. One of the speakers at the event declared “Hands off from 
those who have a leading role in the rat-killing, the New Hungarian Guard”;39 successor of the 
Hungarian Guard.40 Both of which have used Árpád-stripes on their flags and badges, just like 
the Arrow Cross Party did, whose members persecuted, tortured and executed thousands of 
Jews and Roma between 1944-1945. The Guard was eventually banned by the court in July 
2009. Gábor Vona filed an application to the ECtHR against the ban which was unanimously 
rejected by the Court. Jobbik re-established the Guard as “New Hungarian Guard”, and 
although they were never again able to hold public rallies in Budapest, but carried on with its 
 
38  See 444: https://444.hu/2021/03/27/egy-friss-kutatas-szerint-ujra-a-jobbik-a-legnepszerubb-
ellenzeki-part.  
39  ‘Horthy emlékére patkányirtással fenyegetett a Jobbik’. Online: http://nol.hu/belfold/20091123-
horthy_emlekere_patkanyirtassal_fenyegetett_a_jobbik-439871. [Accessed 03 February 2021] 
40  The Hungarian Guard was dissolved by the court in July 2009. 
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propaganda activities, vigilante patrols and marches in villages, such as Gyöngyöspata or 
Hajdúhadháza (Amnesty 2012).  
Taking advantage of the governmental crisis coupled with the increasing anti-Roma attitudes 
in the country, Jobbik received 427,773 votes in the 2009 EP election. One year later, in the 
2010 general election, Jobbik doubled this number and became the third major political party 
by securing 855,436 votes and 47 seats in the Hungarian parliament (Fabry 2015). The party 
has since maintained its popularity and received 1,020,476 (>20% of the votes) and 1,092,806 
votes in the 2014 and 2018 elections respectively. Two-thirds of Jobbik voters are men and, 
in 2014 and before, were either former Fidesz-KDNP or MIÉP voters. They come from various 
age groups, although predominantly young (18-29) and, relatively, educated. The majority of 
the voters live in North-East Hungary which overlaps with the territorial distribution of 
Hungary’s Roma population. This data was corroborated by mapping the Facebook-followers 
of Jobbik (Demos 2013). Additionally, the research found that only 16% of the voters were 
party members, but 35% have participated in at least one demonstration or event organised 
by Jobbik. For most of the voters, Roma-integration represented the biggest issue in Hungary, 
and were pessimistic both regarding their own and the country’s future. Anti-EU sentiments 
and an overall perception of threat to national identity were also prevalent.  
There have been several right-wing media outlets in Hungary. The most important online 
platforms that have served as a communication channel between Jobbik and its voters are 
Kuruc.info and Alfahír (Juhász et al. 2017). Kuruc.info’s popularity started with the 2006 
demonstrations; by 2009, it was the third most visited news site in Hungary (Molnar 2016).  
As Fabry (2015) notes, in parallel with the rise of Jobbik and the establishment of the 
Hungarian Guard, a plethora of similar groups emerged with more or less identical missions; 
some already disappeared or were banned by the authorities. One of the still active 
movements is HVIM (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom – Sixty-four Counties Youth 
Movement) established by László Toroczkai and György Gyula Zagyva (Jobbik MP between 
2010 and 2014) in 2001. HVIM’s central objective has been the pursuit of irredentist and 
revisionist sentiments of the Horthy-era, hence the name “Sixty-four Counties”.41 The group 
has held several protests and events in the neighbouring countries demanding autonomy for 
the former Hungarian territories, such as Transylvania in Romania (cf. Kondor 2018). 
Toroczkai was banned from Serbia, Romania, Slovakia and from Canada for the atrocities he 
and his group had caused.42 Both Toroczkai and Zagyva participated in the 2006 riots and in 
the siege of the Hungarian Television (Toroczkai had a leading role). Toroczkai is a prominent 
figure in right-wing circles who started his career in MIÉP and, besides HVIM, established 
several right-wing movements. He has been mayor of Ásotthalom since 2013, before joining 
Jobbik as Vona’s vice-president.43  
Toroczkai has recently established the party Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland) with Dóra Dúró, 
former Jobbik MP. Following Jobbik’s failure in the 2018 election, Gábor Vona resigned from 
 
41  Prior to Trianon, the Kingdom of Hungary had 63 counties + Fiume with a special legal status as 
“corpus separatum”.   
42  ‘Tények és homály Torockai Lászó különös pályáján: Az út Orbánig’ Magyr Narancs, Online: 
https://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/az-ut-orbanig-111638.  





his position as president. Toroczkai and Dúró, leaders of the radical wing of Jobbik, had 
condemned Vona’s previous attempt of transforming the party into a less radical formation to 
become a people’s party. However, the two failed, and the national board of the party decided 
in favour of the less radical, conservative wing by electing Tamás Sneider as president and 
Márton Gyöngyösi as vice-president. Shortly thereafter, when Toroczkai was expelled from 
the party, both Dúró and his husband, Előd Novák left, followed by many others.44 Because it 
will be its first, it is yet hard to foresee the long-term consequences of Jobbik’s internal struggle 
and how successful Mi Hazánk will be in the 2022 general election. However, it is certainly an 
interesting aspect of the Jobbik-Mi Hazánk conflict, that, as has been argued, Fidesz has 
seemingly taken advantage of and used the conflict for its own electoral purposes. Unlike other 
opposition parties, Mi Hazánk is often given voice, and is widely and actively supported by 
pro-government media. On local level, there has already been actual operative collaboration 
between Fidesz and Mi Hazánk.45   
Another notable movement is Betyársereg (Army of Outlaws) established in 2008. The group 
operates informally with a clan-like structure led by Zsolt Tyirityán. The clan-like structure is 
perhaps not accidental and is widely used by organised crime groups. It makes the mapping 
of the organisational structure more difficult for the authorities; probably basic knowledge to 
‘Army’ members, who, at least some, are former law-enforcement and intelligence officers.46 
The group only recruits “real warriors”, “well-built” individuals, “preferably with martial art 
skills”. Criminal conviction is not a bar to membership; in fact, “most of the members have 
criminal records”.47  
4.2. State agents contributing to radicalisation 
The above movements and parties (and the far-right in general) have had several links to, and 
collaborations with, each other (see Appendix 3). They co-participated in a myriad of events 
and protested together against either “Gypsy-crime”, migration or Budapest Pride (Juhász et 
al. 2017).48 On one known occasion in 2004, HVIM and Jobbik held a roundtable discussion 
on autonomy in Nagyvárad (Oradea, Romania) co-organised with Fidelitas, the youth 
 
44  ‘Dúró Dóra kilép a Jobbikból és követik is páran’ index.hu Online: 
https://index.hu/belfold/2018/06/08/duro_dora_kilep_a_jobbikbol/.  
45  ’Nekünk kedvez a Fidesz radikalizálódása: a Mi Hazánk Mozgalom és a Fidesz kapcsolata’ 
Index.hu Online: 
https://index.hu/belfold/2020/04/02/mi_hazank_mozgalom_nemzeti_radikalis_fidesz/.  
46  ’Náci vagyok, vállalom! Vona meg a barátom’ Index.hu Online: 
https://index.hu/belfold/2015/06/15/naci_vagyok_vallalom_vona_meg_a_baratom/.; ‘A TEK-be is 
beépülnének a szélsőjobboldali nehézfiúk’ index.hu Online: 
https://index.hu/belfold/2014/08/25/nehezfiuk_a_szelsojobboldalon/.; Tyirityán Zsolt a Magyar 
Időkben – “A Betyársereg nem haragszik a Jobbikra! Online: http://betyarsereg.hu/tyirityan-zsolt-a-
magyar-idokben-a-betyarsereg-nem-haragszik-a-jobbikra/.  
47  ‘A betyárok életre keltek, de Budaházy bilincsben van..’ Hunhir. Info, Online: 
http://hunhir.info/hirek/anyaorszag/2009/12/22/A-betyarok-eletre-keltek-de-Budahazy-bilincsben-
van/.  
48  Also see e.g. ‘A Hungarian Nazi group: the Army of Outlaws (Betyársereg) and friends.’ Hungarian 
Spectrum, Online https://hungarianspectrum.org/2011/08/11/a-hungarian-nazi-group-the-army-of-
outlaws-betyarsereg/.; ’Visszatérnek a vonulások Magyarországra: Mi Hazánk-Betyársereg-menet 
jön a “cigányterror” ellen’, 444.hu Online: https://444.hu/2019/05/08/visszaternek-a-vonulasok-
magyarorszagra-mi-hazank-betyarsereg-menet-jon-a-ciganyterror-ellen.;  ‘Ha a Jobbik lesz 




organisation of Fidesz.49 Besides the cobweb-like network of the far-right, there has been an 
alleged cooperation between Betyársereg and the authorities during the “refugee crisis”. 
According to Tyirityán, they were approached by the authorities with a request the Outlaws 
“proudly” took on and “massively took part” in “resolving the migrant crisis”.50 As noted earlier, 
some members of the Betyársereg are former members of Hungarian law-enforcement and 
the Armed Forces; presumably with still active contacts. Hundreds of asylum seekers 
complained at that time about being beaten up by uniformed individuals (cf. Gyollai and Korkut 
2019). As already mentioned, Toroczkai himself posted photos on his Facebook page of 
people on their knees or lying on the ground, face down, with hands tied behind their back.51 
Although with close ties to Betyársereg, at that particular time, the mayor was said to be less 
cooperative when Betyársereg turned up in Ásotthalom offering their “assistance”.52 Abused 
by members of Betyársereg or not, it is yet unclear why there was no criminal investigation 
launched by the police regarding the migrants in Toroczkai’s photos,53 unless what Tirityán 
said was true. Let alone that irregular migrants have reported serious injuries by police as well 
(Gyollai and Korkut 2019). It is also notable that following the atrocities by Magyar Gárda in 
Roma communities, a new criminal offence, “uniformed crime”, was introduced to the Criminal 
Code in May 2011. However, this new criminal offence, to my knowledge, as of the time of 
writing, has never been applied by the authorities.54 In one way or another, Tyirityán once said 
in an interview that “there are people in Fidesz in the parliament, not only one or two, who 
acknowledge and respect our work. Not only that, but there are some who helped us and 
whom we helped”.55 Collaboration between the far-right and the Police is not as far-fetched 
as it sounds: Tettrekész Magyar Rendőrszakszervezet, TMRSZ, the biggest police union in 
Hungary, (Ever Ready Hungarian Police Union) made an official cooperation agreement 
with Jobbik in 2009. According to the agreement, the TMRSZ offered help with the 
development of Jobbik’s law-enforcement plan and agreed in promoting it among its 
members. TMRSZ further agreed that it would provide some of its well-known members at 
Jobbik’s disposal to promote the party’s platform.56  
However, as already demonstrated in section 3, the most prominent agent with radical right-
wing platform is now Fidesz. As Mudde, early on, emphasised when reflecting on Orbán’s 
latest political shift: “we devote far too much attention to relatively irrelevant groups and often 
ignore more significant phenomena” (Mudde 2015). From 2010 onward, Fidesz has 
considered Jobbik as its real competitor, rather than the left-liberals, and increasingly started 
 
49  See HVIM’s website: https://www.hvim.hu/a-mozgalomrol-2004.  
50  ‘Tyirityán: A rendszer a Betyársereget is megkereste’ ATV, Online: 
http://www.atv.hu/belfold/20160720-tyirityan-a-rendszer-a-betyarsereget-is-megkereste-a-
migransvalsag-megoldasara/hirkereso.  
51  See supra note 30.  
52  ‘Berágott Toroczkaira a Betyársereg a menekültvadászat miatt’ index.hu Online: 
https://index.hu/belfold/2015/07/13/beragott_a_betyarsereg_toroczkaira/.  
53  ‘Vizsgálja a rendőrség az ásotthalmi mezőőrök akcióját’ HVG Online: 
https://hvg.hu/itthon/20170628_asotthalom_mezoorok_toroczkai_laszlo_menekultek.  
54 Cf. ‘The New Hungarian Guard/For a Better Future Hungarian Self-Defense’, The Orangefiles, 
Online: https://theorangefiles.hu/the-new-hungarian-guardfor-a-better-future-self-defense/.  
55 ‘Tyrityán: nem tartjuk Orbánt közellenségnek’ 24.hu Online: 
https://24.hu/kozelet/2016/11/23/tyirityan-nem-tartjuk-orbant-kozellensegnek/.  
56 ‘Radikalizálódó rendőrök – Szabad a gazda’ Magyar Narancs, 
Online:https://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/radikalizalodo_rendorok_-_szabad_a_gazda-71497. In 




focusing on Jobbik voters, blurring the line between conservatism and right-wing radicalism 
(Krekó et al. 2011). By systematically taking over the narrative of Jobbik and delegitimizing its 
leader,57 it has essentially accomplished the platform of its predecessor. Thus, there is an 
increasing view that Fidesz, both in terms of its rhetoric and policy, has to date become an 
openly authoritarian, xenophobic, Islamophobic and anti-gay radical right party (Karsai 2020; 
Fabry 2019; Krekó, Hunyadi and Szicherle 2019; Özdamar and Ceydilek 2019; Kondor 2018; 
Juhász, Hunyadi, Galgóczi, Róna, Szicherle and Zgut 2017; Bozóki 2016; Mudde 2015; Bíró 
Nagy, Boros and Varga 2012). This transformation of Fidesz and its position swap with Jobbik 
in the political spectrum is perhaps the most visible in the European Parliament (EP). On the 
one hand, Fidesz has been expelled by European People’s Party (EPP) and its members are 
now welcome by far-right party groups,58 and Jobbik has launched negotiations about filling 
the vacant seats and joining EPP, on the other.  
In the past ten years, to mainstream radical right-wing nationalism, Fidesz has monopolised 
and gained almost total control over media in Hungary (including the national broadcaster 
MTVA); the vast majority of which now belong to the umbrella organisation, KESMA,59 
managed by individuals loyal to Orbán.60 Those few representing dissent are under constant 
threat of closure or takeover, such as e. g. Origo, Népszabadság, Index, and most recently 
Klub Rádió. To broadcast and disseminate its agenda, besides its media empire, Fidesz has 
also used giant billboard (hate) campaigns, rallies such as the ‘Békemenet’ (Peace March) 
co-organised by Zsolt Bayer and András Bencsik, and the already mentioned national 
consultations. 
A relatively new pro-government media outlet, outside the domain of KESMA, is Vadhajtások, 
run by the openly racist and radical right blogger Zsolt Bede, whose interviewing skills are 
merely limited to verbal and physical abuse. His interviewing style has however received 
acknowledgment and wide support by dominant Fidesz media platforms. In his own Sunday 
night show on Echo Tv, Bayer himself commented on his performances: “I love the guy…this 
is the right way, this is how you do it”.61     
However, not only the media have served as a platform to channel or disseminate Fidesz’ 
narratives. The Fidesz-KDNP has been consistently reshaping the entire cultural sphere, 
including education, mainstreaming its own Christian-nationalist, “illiberal” worldview. This has 
been well exemplified by the ousting of CEU (Central European University), and, most 
recently, the overtake of SZFE (University of Theatre and Film Arts). SZFE was the only 
university, so far, whose management, teachers, and more importantly, the students 
themselves, but also a wide range of international actors and institutions, stood up against the 
government to preserve the autonomy of the university; none of which seemed to be enough 
 
57  ‘Orbán kicsit lebuzizta Vonát’ Index: 
https://index.hu/mindekozben/poszt/2017/02/20/orban_viktor_kicsit_buzizott_a_szakertok_szerint/.   
58  See Hungary Today: https://hungarytoday.hu/radicals-would-welcome-fidesz-but-party-undecided-
on-ep-future/.  
59  Közép-Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány (Central European Press and Media Foundation). 
60  ‘Demise of Hungary’s media exposes Brussel’s weakness’ Politico, Online: 
https://www.politico.eu/article/brussels-looks-on-powerless-at-hungarian-media-demise-viktor-
orban/.  





and have the desired effect after all.62 Not only that, the Fidesz media launched immediate 
hate campaign against the protesters; Attila Vidnyánszky, Orbán’s appointee to lead SZFE, 
in, again, Bayer’s show, compared the protesting students to Szamuely-soldiers and Lenin-
boys, the killing brigades of the Red Terror.63 Perhaps some clarification is needed as to how 
all this directly relates to radicalisation, let alone the long-term consequences of the 
appointment. At the time of writing, a woman was attacked on the bus in Budapest apparently 
for wearing a “Free SZFE” mask, which has earlier become the symbol of solidarity with the 
students. The attacker slashed her cheek open with a knife while trying to cut off the mask.64 
Prior to that, a woman escorting her friend with a dislocated knee, was refused entry to the 
waiting room of a GP for wearing the same mask.65 Vidnyánszky, who has already, essentially, 
controlled theatre profession in Hungary, was appointed to direct the National Theatre by the 
government in 2012, replacing the very successful, but openly gay Róbert Alföldi for that 
matter.   
 
5. Stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation  
Because the main agent of radicalism is the government itself, it is perhaps not surprising that 
efforts of de-radicalisation in Hungary remain with non-state actors, such as civil society 
organisations, charities and research groups (cf. Vékony 2016). This chapter very briefly 
introduces the most important of the very few stakeholders of de-radicalisation, their initiatives 
and programmes. The discussion more or less follows the structures of radicalisation as 
outlined above, i.e. the focus is on agents seeking to prevent and reduce a) anti-Roma b) anti-
immigrant / Islamophobic, c) anti-LGBTQ hate crime. It is difficult to measure how successful 
these agencies are, given that the government has curtailed migrants/LGBTQ rights on policy 
and constitutional level and is supported by nearly the entire media. The section ends with 
programmes conducted with the aim to prevent radicalisation in prisons.  
In the aforementioned case where the court ordered the government to pay financial 
compensation for the children in Gyöngyöspata for their years-long segregation at school, the 
children were represented at the court by the Chance for Children Foundation (CFCF). The 
Foundation especially focuses on the fight for equal rights and opportunities for Roma children 
in education in Hungary. Not only does it provide legal support for them, but also organises 
community activities to pursue its goal and counter segregation. CFCF was founded in 2004.66 
Társaság a Szabadságjogokért (TASZ – Hungarian Civil Liberties Union) is one of the biggest 
NGOs for human rights protection in Hungary. It was founded in 1994 and since has been 
 
62  ‘Hungary: Protesters rally against university takeover in Budapest’ BBC Online: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-54052182.  
63  ‘Vidnyánszky: ha a mostani vezetés nem képes elindítani az oktatást, akkor mi elindítjuk.’ 444.hu 
Online: https://444.hu/2020/09/14/vidnyanszky-ha-a-mostani-vezetes-nem-kepes-arra-hogy-
elinditsa-az-oktatast-akkor-mi-elinditjuk.  
64  ‘Megvágták egy nő arcát a csepeli buszon, feltehetőleg az SZFE-s maszkja miatt’ 
https://telex.hu/belfold/2021/02/25/megkeseltek-egy-not-egy-csepeli-buszon-mert-szfe-s-maszk-
volt-rajta.  
65  ‘Nem engedtek be egy nőt az orvosi rendelőbe, mert „#free-SZFE” maszk volt rajta’ 
https://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/nem-engedtek-be-egy-not-az-orvosi-rendelobe-mert-free-szfe-
maszk-volt-rajta-134713.  
66  See http://www.cfcf.hu/en/about-us.  
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providing legal aid for anybody who have been discriminated or become victim of abuse of 
power. TASZ has about 2500 legal cases per year, but they also provide awareness training 
and are involved in advocacy through media campaigns and presentations nationwide.67 
The Muslim population in Hungary was 5,579 according to the 2011 census (cf. Jones-Gailani 
and Gőbl 2019); a number unlikely changed extensively after 2015, given that Hungary has 
been a transit country. The most important organisations for Hungary’s Muslim community, 
are the Organisation of Muslims in Hungary (Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza – MME) and 
the Hungarian Islamic Community (Magyar Iszlám Közösség – MIK). Both institutions play 
crucial role in the support of the Muslim community, in their integration, as well as religious 
education to prevent radicalisation (Szentágotay 2011). Their joint organisation, the Islamic 
Council of Hungary (Magyarországi Iszlám Tanács – MIT) was established in 2011 and 
officially recognised as church in 2012. To prevent Islamophobic hate crime, the Hungarian 
Islam Advocacy Association (Magyar Iszlám Jogvédő Egyesület - MIJE) was established in 
2016. The Association registers hate crime incidents, provides legal aid for victims (cf. Jones-
Gailani and Gőbl 2019). 
Besides fighting against Islamophobia, one of the most important NGOs in Hungary whose 
aim is to support and facilitate the integration of migrants, in general, is Menedék (Migránsokat 
Segítő Egyesület – Hungarian Association for Migrants). Within the many activities of 
Menedék, the NGO regularly run trainings for professional whose work involves contact with 
asylum seekers, such as reception centre staff, immigration (detention) officers, police, health 
care professionals and teachers. The trainings focus on competence-building, intercultural 
skills, conflict management. Menedék has conducted several (research) projects in support of 
their mission.   Another important NGO dedicated to protecting the human rights not only of 
migrants but also detainees and victims of abuse of power in general is the Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee (HHC). Helsinki’s staff includes lawyers, medical doctors, sociologists, economists 
and journalists. Besides legal assistance and representation they also provide professional 
training activities and are engaged in research.68 
The oldest and most well-known NGO who supports Hungary’s LGBTQI community is Háttér 
Society, founded in 1995. Its primary aim is to draw attention to difficulties and problems 
LGBTQI people face in their everyday life in Hungary and to provide them assistance and 
adequate support. Háttér is dedicated to giving voice to LGBTQI people who are discriminated 
and to protect their human rights, as well as to mainstream their recognition in terms of social 
policy. They also seek to promote the well-being and health of LGBTQI people. To achieve 
these aims, Háttér is engaged in advocacy, research, various training activities and cultural 
events, and provide counselling (hotline, online and personal) and legal aid.69      
Concerning LGBTQI hate crime prevention, a relatively recent case at the National University 
of Public Service (NKE) exemplifies the “illiberal” transformation of (higher) education by 
Fidesz and is perhaps worth mentioning. In early 2019, the University participated in a hate 
crime awareness project and in the subsequent training called ‘Facing All the Facts’ 
coordinated by CEJI (A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe) and co-funded by the EU 
 
67  See https://hclu.hu/en/about-us.  
68  See https://www.helsinki.hu/en/about_us/.  
69  See Hatter’s website: https://en.hatter.hu/what-we-do.  
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and the Open Society Foundation.70 Later in the same year, the University was scheduled to 
host the closing conference of another consortium project ‘Call It Hate: Raising Awareness of 
Anti-LGBT Hate Crime’ with the participation of 50 partners (Háttér was participating in both 
projects). However, the University pulled out just a few weeks before the conference date. 
When the co-organiser of both projects, expert of hate crime, Andrea Kozáry, then Professor 
of the University, raised the issue with the management, NKE terminated her contract on 17 
October after over 25 years of employment.71 What is decisive is this: László Kövér, Speaker 
of the House in the parliament, founding member of Fidesz and close friend of PM Orbán 
delivered a lecture at NKE on 22 October. In his lecture, Kövér argued that principle of checks 
and balances is “nonsense” and advised the students present to “forget it”. According to Kövér, 
a view he shared at a campaign even in January 2019: “a sound homosexual person knows 
what the world order is; they are aware of that they were born or have become one (gay) and 
try to adapt to the world by not necessarily considering themselves to be equal.” As the 
Speaker of the House noted, “in the moral sense there is no difference” between paedophilia 
and gay adoption (cf. Gyollai and Korkut 2020).      
The first (and, to my knowledge, last) research on the topic in Hungary was conducted in 2017, 
as part of the project, ‘Prevention of radicalisation in the prison-system’ co-ordinated by 
Budapest Centre for the International Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities and funded 
by the Internal Security Fund of the EU. According to the research findings, although 
radicalisation might be an emerging issue in Hungarian prisons, it is not prevalent, and is 
fundamentally distinct from the form of radicalisation known in Western Europe. In other 
words, radicalisation in Hungary does not relate to terrorism, in general, or to jihadist 
radicalisation, in particular. The risk of radicalisation in Hungarian prisons predominantly 
stems from the conflict between different groups in the prison, the relationship between prison 
staff and inmates in particular, i.e. from the treatment of prisoners. Thus, the policy proposals 
focus on the improvement of prison condition, the rehabilitation process, as well as the 
wellbeing, training, payment of staff and their workplace conditions (Hera 2018). At the time 
of writing, I am not aware of a significant change or innovation in this regard.  
Within the above project, the Foresee Research Group provided training for prison personal 
to recognise and adequately respond to potential signs of radicalisation, as well as to improve 
their skills to facilitate the rehabilitation and reintegration of people. Prior to participating in the 
‘Prevention of radicalisation in the prison-system’ project, Foresee led an international 
consortium project called ‘Mediation and Restorative Justice in Prison Settings’ (MEREPS) 
between 2009-2012. The project involved researchers, criminal justice practitioners and 
professionals and policy makers with the overall goal to improve mediation and restorative 
justice practices in prisons.72   
Menedék (see above) has frequently run sensitivity training for the staff in immigration 
detention centres, but, again, these trainings are not compulsory, only voluntary.73 
 
70  ‘A kormányt a gyűlölet szításával vádolják, kedvenc egyetemén ez ellen harcolnak’ 24.hu Online: 
https://24.hu/belfold/2019/01/04/gyulolet-buncselekmeny-nke-rendorseg/.  
71  ‘A kormány kedvenc egyeteme kirúgta a tanárt, aki a homofób gyűlöletről szervezett konferenciát’ 
24.hu Online: https://24.hu/belfold/2019/10/29/nke-tanar-kirugas-kozary-andrea-konferencia/.  
72  See http://mereps.foresee.hu/en/about-mereps/.  
73  See https://menedek.hu/kepzeseink/kepzesi-kinalatunk.  
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6. Conclusion  
The only relevant form of radicalisation in contemporary Hungary is right-wing extremism with 
anti-establishment, ethno-nationalist and religious elements. There have been several right-
wing group and/or party formations since the collapse of the one party system in 1989, all of 
which, however, have nurtured themselves and their platforms from the political legacy of the 
interwar Horthy-regime. The denial of, and total lack of reconciliation with, history is, perhaps, 
one of the main reasons that underlie radicalisation in contemporary Hungary. A mixture of 
irredentism, Christian-nationalism, anti-communism and anti-Semitism has formed the 
platform of both Jobbik and Fidesz. Fusing anti-establishment and anti-Roma sentiments, the 
Jobbik emerged as the third political power following the 2006 crisis of the socialist-liberal 
government. From the 2010 onward, Fidesz has however become more and more radical than 
its competitor and come to dominate the (right-wing) political spectrum. Securing 
supermajority in three consecutive terms, Fidesz in coalition with KDNP, has reshaped the 
legal framework and public policy, in, essentially, all segments of public administration and 
established a right-wing autocracy in Hungary. Following the 2015 “refugee crisis”, as a result 
of the overwhelming campaign, ant-immigrant sentiments peaked in the country and Fidesz 
transformed the Hungarian society into one of the most xenophobic Member States. Moreover, 
the Orbán government has been reshaping the entire cultural sector, including education, in 
line with its Christian-nationalist, “illiberal” ideology by unilaterally depriving certain institutions’ 
autonomy and/or delegating its own appointments in their management. Because 
radicalisation has become a state-led process, de-radicalisation initiatives and efforts have 
been pursued solely by non-state actors, such as CFCF, TASZ, HHC, Menedék, Háttér, MIJE 
and MEREPS. With Fidesz in power, significant change in both political discourse and social 
policy can hardly be anticipated. Even if the Opposition collation win in the upcoming general 
election in 2022, the more than a decade long polarisation has arguably caused a long-lasting 





Appendix 1. Main radicalisation events in Hungary since 2001 
Event Period Description 
Őszöd-Speech and 
subsequent protests 
September - October 2006 Climax of anti-establishment 
sentiments: At a congress in 
Balatonőszöd, then PM 
Ferenc Gyurcsány criticised 
his party (MSZP) for lying to 
the electorate. The speech 
was leaked and broadcasted 
in the national radio igniting 
a series of protests. 
Roma Murders July 2008 – August 2009 Extreme right-wing violence: 
Six people were killed, 
including children, many 
others left seriously injured. 
The killers were far-right 
extremist whose motivation 
was to resolve and revenge 
“Gypsy crime”. 
Gay bar attack 2008 In summer 2008, a gay bar 
and a gay sauna were hit by 
a Molotov cocktail. Although 
no organisation claimed the 
attacks, they were attributed 
to Hunnia, a far-right 
movement established by 
György Budaházy and 
Toroczkai to carry out armed 
attacks against members of 
the Gyurcsány government. 
Refugee “Crisis” 2015 – (ongoing) Anti-immigrant moral panic: 
The Fidesz-KDNP has 
successfully constructed 
threat of asylum seekers; 
anti-immigrant rhetoric has 
since been dominating 
political discourse.  
“Migrant Hunting”  2015-2016 László Toroczkai, mayor of 




region) organised a civil 
militia to capture irregular 
migrants in the vicinity of the 
village. 
Homophobic intimidation in 
Auróra. 
September 2019 In September 2019, a group 
led by Budaházy disrupted 
an LGBTQI awareness 
event in Auróra in the 
presence of the police. 
Raid of Auróra October 2019 in October 2019, several 
dozens of members of Légió 
Hungária (Legion Hungary) 
raided Auróra and put Neo-
Nazi sticker all over the 
place. They also removed a 
rainbow flag from the 






Appendix 2. Discourses of radicalisation in Hungary 
Quotation Speaker/ 
Author 
Date Source Comments 
“I know how many Hungarians 
live in Israel and how many 
Jewish from Israel live in 
Hungary. With respect to this 
incident, it is high time to clarify 
how many people of Jewish 
descent live here, and, especially, 
are in the Hungarian parliament 
and government, who pose a risk 



















this comment as 
a reflection on the 
2012 Israeli 
operation in the 
Gaza Strip. 
“There was a time when a large 
number of people immigrated in 
this city from outside the city. You 
saw the consequences. The 
people of Miskolc have 
experienced how it is if something 
like that happens. Let alone that 
those who then came, already 
came to Miskolc from Hungarian 
territory. Now, imagine when 
people come from abroad whose 
culture, traditions, lifestyle are 
totally different from ours (…) 
Migrants always move to big 
cities, this is where ghettos, no-go 
zones and parallel societies 


















Orbán in a 
campaign event 
in Miskolc before 
the 2018 election, 
referring to the 
Roma population 
of Miskolc in the 
context of mass 
migration. 
“Heroes for us here in Hungary 
are those who protect and defend 
that which is ours, our freedom, 
our families, our way of life and 
our country. Heroes for us are 
those who take an oath to do this 
and are true to their oath. Today 
you have taken an oath to defend 
the borders of Hungary, and our 
wider homeland of Europe (...) If 
there is no border defence, if 
there are no brave men and 
women to guard our borders, 




























security, there is no order, and 
there is no progress either. Then 
all we have will be uncertainty, 
fear, chaos, anger, and trucks 















“I am not from Gyöngyöspata, but 
if I lived there, I would definitely 
wonder why, for whatever reason, 
members of a significant ethnic 
group living in the same 
community and village I live, will 
get a serious amount of money 
without working at all, while I am 
























Orbán on the 






2007 and 2014. 
“I would be extremely glad if 
those who consider themselves 
proud Hungarian Jews played 
with their tiny, circumscribed willy 
in their spare time instead of 
slandering me. Your kind got 
used to all our kind74 immediately 
stand to attention whenever you 
fart. Please do note: this is 
OVER!!!! We’ve raised our head, 
and we are not going to take this 
terror of your kind any longer. 



















she should be 
banned from 
politics because 
of her tone and 
rhetoric. 
 
74 The Magukfajta – magunkfajta terminology introduced by Morvai has long dominated right-wing 
discourse in Hungary, picked up and favoured by many politicians. 
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“And these are the facts: the vast 
majority of Roma are incapable of 
co-existence; are incapable of 
living with human beings. This 
proportion of Roma are animals 
and behave like animals. They 
mate whenever and with whoever 
they want, whoever and wherever 
they spot. If encountering 
resistance, they kill. They 
defecate wherever and whenever 
they are caught short. If they feel 
obstructed, they kill. They want 
whatever they spot. If they don’t 
get it immediately, they take it and 
kill. This proportion of Roma is 
incapable of any kind of 
communication you would call 
human. Mainly inarticulate sounds 
plop out of their animalistic skull, 
and the only thing they can 
comprehend in this wretched 
world is violence.” 















on a pub 
stabbing. 
“There are some forms of crime 
that are specifically linked to 
Roma ethnicity - e.g. mass brawl, 
stealing non-ferreous metal, 
stabbing, stealing timber, usury, 
etc.  – which can only be handled 
with in a specific way due to the 
ethnic nature. It has to be 
declared that Gypsy-crime exists 
and is spreading. We should not 
argue about the terminology, but 
to solve the problem.” 

















creed (once on 
their website, now 
removed).  
“When an armed horde knocks 
down the border fence of a 
sovereign country, when this 
horde attempts to break into a 
sovereign country, when this 
horde attacks the police 
defending the border, then 
nobody can question and can find 
an excuse any longer: the country 
is under siege. Hungary is under 
siege. Nothing like that has 
happened for 59 years (Bayer 
here refers to the Soviet army in 
1956)…We have been real 
careful, both beyond and within 




















stranded on the 
Serbian side 
clashed with the 
border police (in 
full gear).  
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border, not to experience that 
again. Now we are experiencing it 
again. We have to hold. Not only 
the police who have been working 
and now defending the country 
tirelessly, and not only the 
soldiers deployed at the border, 
not only the government, but all of 
us.” 
“I find any group or nation’s 
world-leading ambitions 
disgusting; that of the Jews as 
well. And I see precisely this 
arrogance in your behaviour. 
Because no party leader, apart 
from myself, would ever tell you 
such things, I am going to tell 
you. It is good if you hear some 
dissent opinion besides the 
amount of arse-licking you get. 
Because what I am writing you 
is the joint opinion of many 
Hungarians (…) Not everyone is 
afraid of you in my homeland 
either. I am not afraid either. 
Perhaps one day you will shoot 
me down like a dog with a 
missile, but not even then I’d be 
afraid in my own homeland. 
Keep that in mind! I’ll never be 
Israel’s dog, like all the parties in 
the parliament here. Do you get 
that? Never! Neither can you 
buy me, nor threaten me. And 
the same goes to many, and just 
becoming more and more.” 









letter in response 









awarded by the 
government. 
“We have legislation in Hungary 
that apply to homosexuals, the 
basis of which is an extremely 
tolerant and patient approach. 
That is, Hungarians are patient 
towards this phenomenon. 
Moreover, Hungarians are so 
patient, that we take even such 
provocative demonstrations, I am 
not saying without words, but 
fairly well. Thus, it is safe to say 
that Hungary, with respect to 
homosexuality, is a tolerant and 


















on the publishing 
of the children’s 
book (see above) 
with LGBTQ 





line that cannot be crossed - to 
sum up: Leave our children 
alone!” 
“Orbán has long successfully 
forced the Opposition into fights 
over topics he picked. But it would 
not have worked without us. Us, 
the Opposition. We have picked 
up the gauntlet thousands of 
times. Orbán picks a target and 
we defend ourselves. Why? This 
time – based a children’s book – 
the target are views that, 
according to him, corrupt our 
children. What Orbán says and 
does is clearly provocative. And 






















to the LGBTQ 









Appendix 4. Main de-radicalisation programmes in Hungary 
Name  Dates  Agents Approach Scale Targets 
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